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India, a late integrator in the global market for clothing, has followed a path to 
integration that is quite different from the experience of some of its major competitors. 
Unlike China, Mexico, Eastern Europe and other South Asian countries, India’s recent 
surge  in  clothing  exports  has  occurred  despite  the  lack  of  major  FDI  in  textile  and 
apparel, or entry into preferential regional trade agreements with buyer countries, or any 
significant direct role of global buyers.  Arguing that changes in domestic policy and in 
the structure of domestic demand throughout the 1980s and 1990s played an important 
role in triggering new growth in India’s textiles and apparel exports, and reshaping the 
capabilities of local firms, this paper examines three features of India’s recent integration 
into global clothing markets: the striking emergence of design as a source of comparative 
advantage in Indian apparel, the growing importance of outward-bound investment by 
Indian clothing firms in recent years, and the powerful new role that retail is playing in 
organizing the Indian domestic market, driven in part by surging consumer demand from 
entirely new mid-market youth segments associated with the country’s  IT-BPO boom.  
 
 
Dr. Arvind Virmani 








The final phase-out of the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA)
2 and the system of 
quotas that has governed the global trade in textiles and apparel for the last forty-two 
years, has significantly altered the institutional rules of trade in the textile and clothing 
industry.  With the elimination of all remaining quotas on apparel from January 1 2005, 
the textile and clothing sector is now fully integrated into the regulatory framework of the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  of  the  World  Trade  Organization 
(WTO).  Buyers are, thus, free to source textile and apparel in any amount from any 
country; suppliers are similarly free to export as much product as they are able, subject 
only to a system of national tariffs (see Weil 2004, Abernathy et. al. 2004). As global 
competition intensifies under the new quota-free trading regime, countries are bracing for 
major changes in the structure of sourcing and apparel supply worldwide.  
 
There is widespread expectation that the removal of quota restrictions will lead to 
a  substantial  consolidation  of  global  supply  networks,  creating  winners  and  losers 
(Gereffi 2004, US ITC 2004, Nordås (WTO) 2004, Knappe 2003).  The widely held 
assumption is that large, low cost supplier countries, such as China, India, and Mexico 
with  stable  supply  networks,  experience  in  exporting,  well-developed  capacities  for 
scaling up and the ability to offer a full bundle of services will benefit from the post-
MFA  reorganization  of  the  global  trade  in  textiles,  while  smaller  countries  that  had 
benefited from the limited but guaranteed access to industrial markets under quotas, may 
well lose out. Already, commentators are pointing to how small countries like Mauritius 
are witnessing an erosion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in apparel, with overseas 
                                                 
1 I thank Gary Gereffi, Arvind Virmani, Danish Hashim, Arpita Mukherjee and participants at three recent 
conferences -  the global networks conference at Yale University, the workshop on ‘The End of Global 
Quotas’ at the Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School, and the ‘Clothing Europe’ workshop at 
UNC – for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.  Karan Singh provided excellent research 
assistance.  The arguments made herein and all errors of fact and interpretation are my responsibility. The 
author can be contacted at mtewari@unc.edu.  
2 The Long Term Agreement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) was first negotiated 
in 1962. It was replaced by the Multi Fiber Arrangement (MFA) in 1974, which in turn was replaced in its 
terminal phase in 1994, and coincident  with the rise of  the WTO, by the  Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC) from 1995 to 2005.   2 
investors beginning to pull out.
3 Most analysts project that China will emerge as the 
likely “supplier of choice” for the world’s largest retailers and buyers after quotas -- 
followed by other large suppliers, such as India, selected South-East Asian countries, 
Eastern Europe, Mexico and Turkey (US International Trade Commission 2004, WTO 
(Nordås) 2004, Knappe 2003).
4    
 
A widely cited study by the WTO, for example, uses models based on relative 
prices, cost competitiveness and the degree of pre-abolition quota-restrictiveness faced by 
individual countries to project that China’s post-MFA share in the US apparel market 
could triple from its current share of 16% to as much as 50% after 2005, and India’s 
could quadruple from about 4% to 15% after the removal of quotas (Nordås 2004). This 
finding suggests, on the face of it, that China and India’s combined export share in the 
US apparel market could be a staggering 65% post-MFA, compared to their combined 
share of 20% in 2003 (Nordås, WTO 2004:30, Financial Times, July 19, 2004).  Though 
the actual dynamics of adjustment are likely to be far more uncertain and contingent upon 
a much wider set of political and institutional processes than these models suggest,
5 it is 
little wonder that countries are worried about their place in the international division of 
labor in textiles and clothing as quotas are phased out.   
 
These concerns are exacerbated by the importance of textiles and apparel to the 
employment  base  and  economic  structure  of  most  countries.  Though  portrayed  as  a 
classic sunset industry, the textile and apparel sector is one of the largest employers in 
both developed and developing countries, often serving as the first point of entry for large 
numbers of unskilled workers (see Berger, Gartner and Karty 1997).  For many countries, 
from Bangladesh to Lesotho to El Salvador where clothing exports respectively constitute 
                                                 
3 See Thomas 2005, Afrol News 2004,  Bradsher 2004. Also see Knappe 2003, US ITC 2004, Gibbon 2000 
and Palpaceur et. al. in press, for a broader discussion on the tightening prospects for small producers in 
accessing global markets after quotas.  In an ironic twist, with the recent return of many Mauritius-based 
India joint ventures back to India, Mauritius topped the list of countries with FDI in India in March 2005. 
4  Based  on  a  cross  country  comparison  of  suppliers  that  benefited  most  from  the  third  stage  of  the 
liberalization of quotas under ATC in January 2002, Knappe (2003) for example found that compared to 
other countries China was the only country to have substantially increase its exports across the board, in all 
the (seven) product categories that the US had liberalized, relative to other countries who improved their 
export performance in only some of the liberalized categories, if at all. 
5 See Smith et. al. 2004, Begg et. al. 2003, and Abernathy et. al. 2004)   3 
up to 86%, 94%,  and 60% of total merchandise exports (USITIC 2004: 1-4), the textile 
and  apparel  sector  is  a  dominant  contributor  to  industrial  output,  foreign  exchange, 
employment and national development. As competition escalates in this sector at home 
and  abroad,  a  central  policy  concern  among  suppliers  worldwide  is  how  firms  and 
governments can shore up the competitiveness of their textile and apparel sectors in this 




This paper uses the case of India, which has been repeatedly cited as a major 
potential  beneficiary  of  the  post-quota  regime,  to  examine  the  emerging  pathways  of 
adjustment in the global textile and clothing industry. Famously inward-looking till the 
1980s, the Indian textile and clothing industry has become increasingly integrated into 
global markets since the late-1980s and 1990s, emerging as one of the top ten global 
exporters of textiles and clothing after 1998. India’s apparel exports grew at an average 
compound rate of 22% per year throughout the 1980s (Chatterjee and Mohan 1993), and 
by about 13% in the 1990s (United Nations Statistical Division, 2005).  By 2003, India 
exported more than $13.5 billion worth of textile and apparel, up fifteen-fold from the 
$0.9  billion  it  exported  in  1985,  when  apparel  exports  were  just  taking  off  (United 
Nations Statistical Division, 2005).  This export growth, though slow in comparison to 
exporters like China, is impressive because it occurred despite the persistence of many of 
the  factors  that  observers  have  cited  as  shackling  Indian  productivity  in  textiles  and 
apparel: technological obsolescence, fragmented capacities, low scales of operation, lack 
of  an  exit  policy,  and  rigid  labor  laws.    Drawing  on  findings  from  three  rounds  of 
fieldwork in India’s textile and apparel industry carried out between 2000 and 2005, this 
paper  examines  the  micro-foundations  of  India’s  rapid  recent  incorporation  into  the 
                                                 
6 Witness for example, the intense lobbying by powerful US textile interests for countervailing measures, 
targeted protections and expedited import reviews against low-cost competitors, especially China, and the 
decision in March 2005 by the US government to step up monitoring of US textile imports (US, ITC 2004, 
Blustein 2004, TC-Trade 2004, Crutsinger 2005, Financial Express 2005); the EU has already built in 
textile safeguards (against China) for the next five years (CEC 2004), and China on its part, has declared its 
intention to impose voluntary restraints on exports so as to make the transition to the world without quotas 
more predictable (Blustein 2004, TC-Trade 2004). At the same time, smaller countries who experienced 
high output and export growth in apparel under quotas, are urgently looking for ways to preserve the 
viability of their suppliers under the new rules of trade.   4 
global clothing and textile market, focusing on how Indian firms have become inserted 
within  global  textile  and  apparel  networks  in  recent  years,  and  how  this  position  is 
changing as the rules of global trade change.   
1.1  Argument 
 
The paper’s main findings are twofold.  First, it shows that India’s path to global 
integration in textiles and apparel differs from the path of its proximate competitors, in 
that it occurred without significant FDI, or entry into regional Free Trade Agreements 
(such as NAFTA) or deep insertion into dominant global clothing supply chains. Rather, 
at  the  vanguard  of  India’s  growing  global  presence  are  a  tier  of  highly  competitive 
domestic firms that were able to restructure themselves during the deregulation of the 
textile  and  apparel  industry  in  the  mid-1980s  (which  first  triggered  export  growth  in 
Indian apparel, as distinct from the trade liberalization of the early 1990s), and build new 
ties with buyers and suppliers at home and abroad in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The 
external sector reforms of 1991 deepened this process of integration that began in the 
mid-1980s.   
 
Second,  the  paper  argues  that  the  same  legacies  that  resulted  in  India’s  slow 
integration into the global textile and apparel market, have also, inadvertently produced 
legacies that could, if nurtured well, move the Indian apparel industry toward a higher 
value-added, design-intensive path of upgrading and adjustment—in addition to scaling 
up.  This  emerging  pattern  resembles  the  experience  of  countries  like  Italy  and  Hong 
Kong more than it resembles the experience of other major apparel exporters who, like 
India, have low wages and low production costs and concomitant factor endowments. 
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.    After  a  brief  framing  of  the 
institutional context and market conditions within which the phase-out of textile quotas 
has  taken  place,  section  three  examines  the  structure  of  India’s  apparel  and  garment 
industry  and  its  emerging  place  in  the  global  market.  Section  four  focuses  on  firm 
strategies in the years leading up to the dissolution of quotas to discuss, in section five, 
three rather unexpected themes that are shaping the post-MFA response of the Indian   5 
textile and clothing industry: the striking emergence of design as a source of comparative 
advantage in Indian apparel, the growing importance of outward-bound investment by 
Indian clothing firms in recent years, and the powerful new role that retail is playing in 
organizing  the  Indian  domestic  market,  fuelled  in  part  by  surging  demand  from  new 
market segments associated with the country’s booming IT and BPO (Business Process 
Outsourcing) sectors.  The final section concludes. 
 
2  Global sourcing: the growing ‘stickiness’ of market access 
 
 
As countries search for ways to strengthen their textile and clothing base in the 
face of intensified quota-free competition, at least three issues complicate adjustment, 
blunting in each case the freer access to markets that the removal of quotas ostensibly 
provides  suppliers.    First,  firms  do  not  simply  export  into  undifferentiated  economic 
space.  As  an  extensive  literature  has  begun  to  document,  global  trade  in  the  apparel 
industry is increasingly organized by powerful buyers, mainly large retailers and branded 
merchandisers (such as Wal Mart, Gap, and Nike) who coordinate the design, production, 
and distribution of apparel within highly mobile, globally dispersed clothing value chains 
(Gereffi 1994, 1999, Bair and Gereffi 2001, Gereffi and Kaplinksy 2001, Feenstra 1998, 
Dicken  1998,  Humphrey  and  Schmitz  2000).  Trade,  in  this  framework,  is  “sticky,” 
because  market  access  is  often  contingent  upon  suppliers’  entry  into  increasingly 
concentrated  clothing  chains  and  production  networks.    After  the  removal  of  quotas, 
when  buyers  are  no  longer  required  to  distribute  their  orders  across  countries,  most 
observers expect entry barriers into these chains to tighten even further (USITC 2004:2-7, 
Gereffi 2004, Palpaceur et. al 2005).  
 
This implies that after the dissolution of quotas, access to major markets may in 
fact become more constrained as global buyers restructure their sourcing patterns towards 
highly competent ‘full-package’ suppliers.  These suppliers would have the capability to 
not  only  provide  made-to-order  assembly  operations,  but  to  flexibly  accommodate 
variability in design, local and proximate sourcing of high quality fabrics and accessories, 
and handle both, small-batch as well as large volume production cost-effectively (Gereffi   6 
2004, Gibbon 2004, Palpaceur et. al. 2005, Smith et. al. 2004). Market access, in this 
view  then,  depends  not  only  on  low  costs,  or  freer  trade,  but  on  the  ability  of  local 
suppliers to meet increasingly stringent buyer demands for quality, customization, and 
short lead times (i.e., full package supply), in addition to keeping costs low.  
 
Second, the emergence of new considerations in sourcing, such as the importance 
of replenishment and short turn-around times in the sourcing of time-sensitive, quick-
selling items (such as jeans and T-shirts), has added further stickiness to the flow of 
apparel  and  textile  trade,  reinforcing  the  importance  of  location  in  supplier  choice 
(Abernathy et. al. 1999, Abernathy, Volpe and Weil, 2004, Nordås 2004, Palpaceur et. al. 
2005).  Acting in a direction opposite to the dynamic of extensive outsourcing within 
globally dispersed production networks, the rise of ‘lean-retailing’
7 and the adoption of 
sophisticated information technologies to manage the sourcing of replenishment-intensive 
items, is privileging speedy delivery and proximity over considerations of price. (For 
example, Mexico or the Caribbean basin, despite their higher production costs may be 
preferred by US buyers over lower cost China for the supply of certain items.)  These 
new trends are making sourcing patterns sticky, and serving to fragment the geography of 
apparel  production  into  ever-finer  regional  sub-divisions  (see  Abernathy,  Dunlap, 
Hammond and Weil,1999,  Nordås 2004).    
 
These  spatial  divisions are  being  further  reinforced  by  the  rise  of  regionalism 
within  world  trade,  and  the  proliferation  of  Regional  Free  Trade  Agreements.    By 
privileging some countries over others in terms of tariff-free market entry, regional trade 
agreements
8 are segmenting market-access on the basis of differentially applicable tariff 
levels.    In  a  world  without  quotas,  where  tariffs  (or  their  absence,  and  of  non-tariff 
barriers) assume much greater power in shaping market access, regional trade agreements 
can  produce  highly  differentiated  and  uneven  geographies  of  apparel  sourcing  and 
                                                 
7 Abernathy, et. al. 1999. 
8  These include agreements that have emerged around every major market: NAFTA, CBI, AGOA, CAFTA 
around the US, the expansion of the European Union and concessionary bilateral agreements and customs 
unions between  the EU and  its regional  suppliers in North  Africa, the Mediterranean  basin, ECE and 
Turkey. 
   7 
supply.  At a time when the dissolution of quotas is restructuring the rules of trade in 
textiles and clothing, and the emergence of preferential regional trade agreements and 
new forms of sourcing are complicating market access, it is important to understand the 
diversity of ways in which suppliers are becoming incorporated into global markets and 
the varied pathways of upgrading that are emerging. 
 
In the following sections we examine India’s recent integration into the global 
apparel market to explore one such pathway of global insertion and upgrading.   
 
3  India’s trajectory of global integration 
 
 
Like in many countries, the textile industry has played a “leading sector” role in 
the Indian economy.  It is one of India’s oldest and most deeply rooted manufacturing 
sectors,  and  a  major  employer.  The  textile  and  clothing  sector  provides  direct 
employment  (formal  and  informal)  to  an  estimated  38  million  people  nationwide
9 
(compared to the estimated 1.2 million employed in the IT sector, and about 650,000 in 
the  booming  Business  Process  Outsourcing  industry  (Ministry  of  Textiles,  Annual 
Report,  2004,  Nasscom  2005).    The  industry  contributes  7%  to  Gross  Domestic 
Product,
10  14%  to  industrial  output  and  an  estimated  18%  to  industrial  employment. 
(Ministry of Textiles, 2004, Hashim 2005).  Moreover, with very low import intensities - 
of only 1.2% (Verma 2002, Ministry of Textiles, 2005) -  the textile and clothing industry 
is  one  of  India’s  largest  net  earners  of  foreign  exchange,  contributing  about  21%  of 
India’s export earnings annually (Ministry of Textiles, 2005, WTO statistics 2005).   
 
In 2003, the latest year for which data are available, India exported $13.5 billion 
in textiles and apparel,
11 more than double the amount ($5.9 billion) it exported ten years 
ago.  Its apparel exports, of $6.6 billion, ranked 8
th in the world market that year (behind 
                                                 
9 The figures are for 2003-04 from the Ministry of Textiles. 
10 The standard figure for the textile industry’s contribution to GDP is 4%; however, working backwards 
from actual export figures to GDP shares, we estimate the share of textiles and apparel in GDP to currently 
be closer to 7% than 4%.   8 
Mexico and France), and its textile exports of $6.8 billion ranked ninth (after France and 
just ahead of Japan). By way of comparison, China, the top ranked exporter of apparel 
and textiles exported $52 billion worth of apparel that year (eight times more than India) 
and $27 billion in textiles (four times India’s exports). Mexico, ranked tenth, exported 
$7.3 billion in apparel and $1.2 billion in textiles in 2003. The principal markets for 
Indian textile and apparel exports are the US and the European Union (EU-15)—the two 
largest  erstwhile  quota  regimes,  which  together  accounted  for  83%  of  India’s  total 
clothing exports and 52% of its textile exports in 2003.
12  While the EU, with a 47% 
share in India’s apparel exports (and a 29% share in textiles) is India’s largest regional 
market for clothing and textiles, the US has emerged as the fastest growing, single largest 
destination for Indian textile and apparel in recent years. In 2003 it procured 36% of 
India’s apparel and 23% of its textile exports. (See  
Figure 1 and Figure 2). Of all the major importing countries, India’s presence is 
weakest in the Japanese market.  Japan procured only 1% of India’s apparel exports and 
3% of its textiles in 2003 (WTO statistics, 2005).
13 While India’s apparel exports are 
highly concentrated in the EU and US, its textile markets are more diversified -- nearly 
half (48%) of India’s textile exports were directed to countries outside the US and EU in 
2003, compared with only 17% in the case of apparel (see Table 1). Apart from the US, 
UK, Germany and Italy, a mix of middle-income countries and emerging markets such as 
UAE (United Arab Emirates), South Korea, Turkey, Bangladesh and Hong Kong are 
among India’s top ten markets for textiles (in that order).  Overall, India’s share in the 
$408  billion  world  clothing  and  textile  market,  though  small  –  a  very  modest  3.3% 
compared especially with China’s spectacular 20% -- has been rising steadily in the last 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 By way of comparison, India’s fastest growing sector, IT and IT enabled services, had $9.9 billion in 
exports in the same year (Nasscom, 2005:26). 
12 Though the EU and US were always important markets for India’s exports, for a brief period in the 1960s 
and 1970s—during the apogee of the cold war and amid tensions between the US and India leading up to 
the Bangladesh war in 1971—the former Soviet Union became India’s major market. Till 1962 the former 
Soviet Union had only a 10% share in India’s apparel exports. In 1965 this shot up to 40%, then to 70% in 
1967 and to 53% in 1970, before falling back to 19% in 1974 and 10% in 1978 (UN Trade Statistics cf. 
Chatterjee and Mohan 1993:M-99).  The devaluation of the rupee in 1966 could also be a reason for the 
rather steep dampening of the dollar-denominated share of US and EU’s imports relative to the rupee-trade 
with the former Soviet Union.  
13 By contrast, 30% of China’s apparel exports and 48% of its textile exports are consumed by Japan, which  
is China’s largest market in textiles and clothing. 
   9 
two decades – growing from 1.5% in 1980 to 2.3% in 1990 and 3.3% in 2003 (UN 
Statistical Division, 2005, Ramaswamy and Gereffi 1998). 
Table 1: India’s Clothing and Textile Exports - 1985, 2003 
 
(US$ Million and percentage)           
                 
   Clothing Exports     Textile Exports 
   Value  Share (%) 
% 
Change        Value  Share 
   1985  2003  1985  2003  1985-03        2003  2003 
EU-15  332  3012  36  47  807%     EU-15  1888  29 
US  263  2309  29  36  778%     US  1528  23 
Japan  25  95  3  1  280%     Japan  176  3 
Fmr USSR  172  0  19  0       Fmr USSR  0  0 
Rest of the World  121  1146  13  16  847%    
Rest of the 
World  3259  45 
Total  914  6562  100  100  618%     Total  6851  100 
Source: WTO Statistics                 
 
Figure 1: India’s apparel export growth 1991-2003 
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Figure 2: India’s textile export growth 1991-2003 
 
 
Three features are striking when one compares India with other countries that 
have emerged as successful exporters of garments and textiles in recent years.  
3.1  A late start 
 
First, India’s apparel exports are of relatively recent vintage, having taken off 
only in the mid-1980s, well after the first and second wave of global outsourcing in the 
1970s  and  1980s  established  strong  apparel  export  platforms  across  East  Asia,  Latin 
America, China and Southern Africa.  Till the 1960s and 1970s India was mainly an 
exporter of textiles, it barely had any export-oriented garment production.  The linkages 
of  India’s  apparel  industry  with  global  clothing  chains  are  therefore  shallower  and 
relatively recent, a point we return to momentarily. 
3.2  An extensive domestic fibre and fabric base  
 
Second, India’s apparel exports are embedded within a strong domestic textile 
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originated  with  export-oriented  apparel  assembly  in  the  1970s  and  1980s,  gradually 
linking backwards into textiles in a small number of cases, the development of India’s 
textile industry preceded the rise of its apparel sector.  India has an extensive fibre base—
largely in cotton—and though organized in much smaller average unit sizes compared to 
firms in other supplier countries, its production capacities and raw material availability 
are second only to China’s.  With a 13% share in the global production of textile fibres, 
India is the third largest global producer of cotton yarn, the second largest producer of 
silk, and the 5
th largest producer of synthetic fiber/yarn. It is one of a few developing 
countries today (along with China, Turkey, parts of Eastern Europe and Pakistan) with a 
fully developed textile value chain  extending from fibre to fabric to  garment exports 
(illustrated  also  by  very  low  import  intensities  (1.2%)  of  its  apparel  exports).    The 
presence of a domestic textile industry—a legacy of the countries vast capabilities in 
cotton production and the government’s efforts to harness this abundant raw material 
base  to  generate  employment  and  ensure  adequate  availability  of  cloth  for  domestic 
consumers—is emerging as a major advantage for India’s apparel exports.  As India’s 
apparel firms compete for market share in a world where timely deliveries, low costs, 
variability and quality are critical, the proximate availability of good quality textiles is a 
major benefit as some have noted (Gereffi 2004, Berger and Lester 1997).  
3.3  Barriers to global integration  
 
Third,  India  has  integrated  relatively  slowly  in  the  global  apparel  and  textile 
market relative to many of its comparators.  Despite large raw material availability and 
extensive production capacities, second only to China’s, its share in the global market in 
textile and clothing has risen only slowly, from 1.5% in 1975 to only  3.3% in 2003 
compared to China’s rapid increase of world market share in textiles and apparel from 
8.9% in 1990 to 20% in 2003.  Till the 1970s and early1980s, when apparel production 
first began to be off-shored to developing countries across East Asia, Latin America, 
China and Southern Africa, India’s apparel exports were miniscule – amounting to less 
than 2% of total exports (with a 0.6 percent share in the global apparel market in 1970 
compared to Hong Kong’s 11% market share that year, for example).   
   12 
This slow global integration resulted, in part, from the highly restrictive quotas 
that  constrained  India’s  export  volumes  throughout  the  late  1970s,  1980s,  and  1990s 
(Kathuria,  Martin,  and  Bharadwaj  2001,  Verma  2002)—given  that  a  bulk  of  India’s 
apparel exports were historically directed to countries with the most stringent quotas – 
the US and EU – in comparison with countries like China, whose export markets were 
much more diversified and less dependent on quota countries.  In 1985 when India’s 
apparel exports first took off, 65% of its apparel exports were being absorbed by the US 
and EU—the biggest quota regimes, and by 2003 this figure had risen to a staggering 
83%. By contrast, China’s combined apparel exports to the US and EU were only 42% in 
1985 and had risen marginally to 47% by 2003 (Data are for SITC 84, Rev. 1 and 3).  
Non-quota  countries  like  Japan  and  Hong  Kong  were  important  markets  for  China 
historically – together accounting for 32% of China’s exports in 1985.  By 2003, Japan 
had emerged as China’s single largest textile and apparel market, absorbing fully 30% of 
China’s apparel exports and 48% of its textile exports in 2003 (UN Statistics 2005 for 
SITC 84 and 65 respectively). 
 
While quota constraints have played a role in slowing India’s export volumes in 
certain product categories since the mid-1970s, India’s slow integration in global textile 
and  apparel  markets  reflects  mostly  the  historically  strong  domestic  focus  of  Indian 
textile policy.  Throughout the late 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s the Indian state used a 
variety of regulatory mechanisms and policies to orient the textile and apparel industry 
toward the domestic market, and shape the structure of the industry in key ways. Using a 
strict  licensing  regime  (that  required  firms  to  seek  permission  from  the  government 
before establishing new operations and expanding capacity), reservation policies (that 
reserved key segments of the value chain—most notably apparel—for production in the 
small  scale  sector),  and  labor  laws  (which  restricted  exit  and  retrenchment  heavily, 
especially after 1976), the government controlled the size, location, scale, growth and 
expansion of the textile and apparel industry throughout this period. The government also 
controlled  the  extent  of  exports  and  the  contents  of  the  sector’s  imports  through  a 
complex  system  of  taxation  and  subsidies.    Spinning  firms  were  also  subject  to  a 
mandatory ‘hank yarn obligation’ to ensure low-cost supply of specialized yarn for small   13 
handloom and power-loom firms.  These arrangements oriented the mill sector (spinning 
and yarn) powerfully towards the small-scale power-loom based weaving sector, which in 
turn was oriented primarily towards domestic consumption.  As Table 2 shows, nearly 
99% of India’s fabric production is in the power-loom sector, and even as late as 1990, 
exports  constituted  only  3%  of  total  sales  among  the  top-ten  cohort  of  textile  firms 
(Prowess data base2005). 


















Spinning mills -- Large and medium (inc composite)  1782  1824  1850  1846  1860  1875  5% 
Small scale spinning mills  801  901  921  996  1046  1146  43% 
Spinning mills (Total)  2583  2725  2771  2842  2906  3021  17% 
              Large and med. Mills as % of Total  58%  57%  56%  59%  54%  53%   
              Small scale mills as % of Total  31%  33%  33%  35%  36%  38%   
                       
Weaving mills (Total)  35287  35999  36902  37603  37707  38209  8% 
             Large and medium weaving units  187  199  202  203  207  209  12% 
             Powerloom weaving units (small scale)  35100  35800  36700  37400  37500  38000  8% 
            Share of large weaving mills in Total  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%   
                       
Source: Ministry of Textiles, 2005               
 
This strong domestic focus is illustrated by the export trajectory of Indian textiles.  
In the mid-1960s, well before India began to export apparel, it was already the eighth 
largest exporter of textiles in the world (UN Statistics 2005). With over half a billion 
dollars ($591 million) of textile exports India had a 7.3% share in the global market in 
1965, just ahead of the US (with 6.6%) and well ahead of Hong Kong at 11
th place with a 
2% market share.  Over the next twenty years—by the early 1980s—this picture had 
essentially reversed. India slipped to 14
th place in textile exports (just behind Turkey), 
while Hong Kong surged to 3
rd place. Later, by 1995 China had emerged as the largest 
textile and apparel exporter in the world and together with Hong Kong and South Korea, 
China accounted for nearly 31% of all textile and apparel sales globally by the late 1990s. 
Meanwhile, India’s share in textile exports stagnated between 1.5 and 2.5% for most of 
the 1970s and 1980s, before rising to 3.8% in 2003, still only a third of what it was in the 
1960s.    While  East  Asia  emerged  as  the  world’s  leading  hub  of  apparel  and  textile   14 
exports, India went the opposite way. It turned strongly toward the domestic market and 
virtually withdrew from exports for the next two decades till the mid-1980s.   
3.4  Policy turnaround: deregulation and external sector reforms 
 
Things  began  to  change  after  1985  when  the  government  revised  its  textile 
policies to shore up the sector’s international competitiveness and increase the sector’s 
foreign  exchange  earnings.    After  a  late  start  and  stagnant  growth  for  several  years, 
India’s apparel and textile exports have recently grown at a rapid pace, especially in the 
last eighteen years.  From barely $30 million in 1970, India’s apparel exports rose to 
nearly a billion dollars in 1990 and to $6.6 billion in 2003 – increasing over 220 times in 
33 years. Textile exports grew seven fold in 23 years – from $1 billion in 1980 to $6.8 
billion in 2003. Taken together, India’s apparel and textile exports accounted for 21% of 
merchandise exports in 2003, up from 3.8% in 1970 (Ministry of Textiles 2005).   
3.4.1  Structural break in the mid-1980s 
 
Many in the literature associate this recent growth of apparel and textile exports 
with the opening up of India’s economy to freer trade in 1991 (McKinsey 2001, D’Souza 
n.d.).  But as Figure 3 shows, and as De Long (2003), Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) 
and  Virmani  (2004)  have  documented  for  Indian  manufacturing  as  a  whole,  India’s 
textile exports, and especially its apparel exports, took off in 1985, well before India 
liberalized trade in the early 1990s (see also Gangopadhyay and Krishnen 2005).
14  1985-
86 represents something of a structural break in the export trajectory of Indian apparel 
(see Figure 3). After relatively slow growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s (compound 
annual growth rate of 1.4% per year in the first half of the 1980s), apparel exports surged 
at an annual compound rate of more than 19% between 1985 and 1990 – just prior to the 
introduction of external sector reforms in India in 1991. After liberalization the growth 
has continued, but at a slightly slower pace.   
 
 
                                                 
14 DeLong 2003, Rodrik and Subramanian 2004, and Virmani 2004 all offer broader evidence that India’s 
growth began in the mid-1980s rather than after liberalization was formally launched in 1991.    15 
Figure 3: Growth of India’s textile and apparel exports showing structural break in 1985-86 
 
 
Source: Computed from UN Trade Statistics and data from Chatterjee and Mohan 1993 
 
 
Indeed, as Table 3 shows, this shift in the pace of apparel exports occurred in 
three  phases,  each  with  distinct  institutional  and  policy  triggers.    The  first  phase  of 
growth took place in the early 1970s. Between 1970 and 1976 India’s apparel exports 
grew seven-fold in six years—rising from $30 million to $200 million, and growing from 
3.8% of India’s merchandise exports in 1970 to 11 percent in 1976.  India’s global share 
in apparel also doubled from 0.6 percent in 1970 to 1.5% in 1976 during this period (UN 
Statistics, 2005). As Chatterjee and Mohan (1993) have pointed out, this early growth 
was  fuelled  by  a  surge  in  demand  from  the  US  and  Europe  for  Indian  handloom 
garments, and clothing of indigenous cotton fabrics (see also Joshi 2003).  But after a 
swift start, this first export surge waned in the late 1970s and early 1980s in part because 
of changes in consumer demand in the US and EU, but also because handloom exports, 
which  were  previously  exempt  from  the  purview  of  quotas  under  the  Multifibre 
Arrangement that had come into existence in 1974, became subject to  greater export 
























Apparel Exports   16 
3.4.2  Domestic deregulation as the critical turning point 
 
The second phase of growth began in the mid-to-late-1980s (See Figure 3) and 
was triggered by the deregulation of the textile industry.  Apparel exports grew strongly 
throughout the 1980s, doing particularly well after 1985 when the government, at the 
recommendation of the Verma Committee’s 1985 report on textiles, adopted a new textile 
policy. Apparel exports more than doubled in just five years following the adoption of the 
new  policy—rising  from  $914  million  in  1985  to  $2.5  billion  in  1990,  an  annual 
compound growth rate of more than 19.3% per year—an impressive resurgence by any 
standards.  Under  the  Textile  Policy  of  1985  the  government  deregulated  the  hitherto 
heavily controlled textile industry, allowing firms to diversify their fabric and fibre base, 
raising the maximum limits on allowable investment, especially for small and medium 
firms, promoting exports through a variety of duty-draw back programs and encouraging 
the sector’s technical modernization through the disbursement of cheaper lines of credit 
and specifically vested funds (such as in the TUF program) that allowed firms, especially 
exporters  to  import  capital  goods  and  technology  at  near  world  prices  (Ministry  of 
Textiles  1999).    These  domestic  policy  shifts,  aimed  as  they  were,  at  boosting  the 
international competitiveness of the Indian textile and clothing sector, appear to have 
strongly influenced exports (see Gangopadhyay and Krishnan 2005 for a detailed account 
of the “pro-incumbent” policy mechanisms during this phase of growth and how they 
impacted the industry).
15    
 
After liberalization, the government further de-licensed the industry, initiated a 
progressive de-reservation of the sector (especially apparel), removed export barriers, and 
slashed  import  duties  especially  for  exporters.    During  this  third  phase  of  growth, 
between the 1990s and early 2000s, textile and apparel exports grew robustly, but at a 
relatively  slower  pace  compared  to  the  1980s  (though  from  a  higher  base).  Apparel 
exports grew at a CAGR of 8% per year between 1991 and 1995, and at 6% per year after 
the Asian currency crisis of 1997, relative to 10% per year throughout the 1980s.  By 
                                                 
15 These reforms included: broad-banding of licenses, removal of restrictions on business houses if they 
operated in backward areas or if they were 100% export oriented, increase in maximum assets of small 
firms, duty free import of technology for export oriented firms or when it significantly improved costs.   17 
2003, apparel exports had increased more than seven times from $914 million in 1985, 
when apparel exports first took off, to $6.6 billion in 2003. Taken together with textiles, 
India’s apparel and textile exports doubled between 1990 and 1996 (from $4.7 billion to 
$9.2 billion), and rose nearly three times to $13.5 billion between 1990 and 2003.  Given 
India’s late start, and the low level from which it began its apparel exports in the 1980s, 
this growth has been quite remarkable. 
Table 3: Indian Apparel – Disaggregated Growth Trends 
(Percent and US$ millions) 
 
 Year 
Compound Annual Growth 
Rate       
1980-1990  10.1       
1991-2000  6.8       
         
1980-1984  1.4       
1985-1990  19.3       
1991-1995  7.8       
1996-2000  5.9       
2001-2003  5.2       
Source: Calculated from UN Statistics and Table 4 Chatterjee and Mohan 1993 
Trade value in current US$ (million)  deflated by CPI index base 1995 (Source WDI) 
 
3.5  Dominance of domestic capital in textile and apparel exports  
 
Several points can be made about this growth and turnaround.  First, it was based 
on  the  domestic  presence  of  a  vast  fibre  and  textile  base,  mainly  of  cotton,  which 
influenced the composition and direction of India’s early apparel exports.  As we saw, the 
first export boom was fuelled by demand for indigenous fabrics and handloom garments. 
   
3.5.1  Growth with very little FDI 
 
Second, this growth was achieved with very little FDI.  Unlike the importance of 
foreign direct investment in countries that have experienced some of the fastest export 
growth in apparel and textiles in recent years,   there is very little FDI in India’s recent 
export  growth.    Between  1991  and  2004  the  Indian  textile  and  apparel  industry  had 
received only $351 million in cumulative FDI, or 1% of the total FDI inflows into India   18 
(of $32 billion) during that period.
16  By contrast, foreign-invested firms account for a 
third of all of China’s apparel exports (UNCTAD 2005); Bangladesh’s apparel industry 
received over 27% of the country’s total FDI (Bangladesh Board of Investment, 2005), 
and as is well documented, South Korean joint ventures played a critical role in the rise 
of Bangladesh’s apparel exports in the 1980s (Rhee 1990). Similarly, Sri Lanka has an 
estimated one thousand garment export firms from 55 countries according to a SAARC 
study (SAARC 2005 n.d.). Of these, nearly 50% are Board of Investment (BOI) approved 
ventures, and account for 90% of Sri Lanka’s total garment exports (SAARC 2005, n.d.).  
Unlike these  and other  countries such  as Mauritius, Mexico and the Caribbean basin 
nations, which similarly have a significant presence of foreign-invested capital in apparel 
and textile exports, India’s textile and apparel exports are dominated by domestic firms as 
Table 4 shows.  
Table 4: India’s Leading Textile and Apparel Companies (2004) – Ranked by Market Capitalization* 
Sector 



















1  Arvind Mills  Ahmedabad, Bangalore   362.3  327.6  124.7  40%  25% 
2 
Indian Rayon & 
Industries 
Bangalore, Mumbai, West 
Bengal  347.0  359.4  86.5  24%  16% 
3  Raymond 
Thane, Mumbai, 
Bangalore  331.3  233.8  48.9  21%  12% 
4 
Indo Rama Synthetics 
(India)  MP, Delhi  193.4  379.9  86.8  23%  23% 
5  Himatsingka Seide  Bangalore  160.5  31.6  28.5  90%  41% 
6 
Bombay Dyeing & 
Mfg Co.  Mumbai  153.2  207.6  14.18  7%  5% 
7  Alok Industries  Mumbai  137.4  244.1  21.12  9%  18% 
8 
Mahavir Spinning 
Mills  Ludhiana  137.0  246.8  63.9  26%  15% 
9  Welspun India  Gujarat, Mumbai  135.6  83.7  62.2  74%  20% 
10  Abhishek Industries  Ludhiana  98.4  117.4  47.5  40%  22% 
               
Source:ETIG Database cf. "Textiles, Bright Prospects" in The ET500, December 2004, pp. 70, www.economictimes.com 
*Ranked by the Economic Times for its ET500 database of the top 500 Indian companies     
** All conversions calculated on the basis of US$1= Rs. 43.8 as on February 11, 2005.b     
               
Source : PROWESS (cmie)              
Definition: 1) Export as a % of Turnover  = Export/Net Sales          
                                                 
16 Similarly other sectors  within India have received  far  more FDI that the Indian apparel and textile 
industry – the Indian auto-industry received 9% of India’s total FDI (more than $2.9 billion), and the 
electrical equipment sector received 12% in the same period that the textile industry received 1% (Ministry 
of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 2005). 
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3.5.2  Exports preceded entry of global buyers 
 
Second,  although  Indian  apparel  exports  are  channeled  through  many  foreign 
buyers today, few of the largest global players or their clothing chains were present in 
India in any significant way when Indian apparel exports first took off in the mid-1980s. 
Unlike the key role that large buyers, major department stores and global retailers like 
Wal Mart, Sears, Nike, Liz Claiborne, VF and others have played in organizing the East 
Asian,  Bangladeshi,  Sri  Lankan,  and  Latin  American,  apparel  export  market  India’s 
export upsurge in the mid-1980s was driven primarily by small-volume, direct exports 
from medium sized Indian producers to retailers, wholesalers, and medium sized buyers – 
initially  in  the  EU,  and  subsequently  in  the  US.  Though  today  the  biggest  names  in 
apparel are sourcing directly from India (e.g, Gap, Banana Republic, Ann Taylor, Nike, 
Reebok, Liz Claiborne, Tommy Hilfiger, Abercombie and Fitch, Sears, Sara Lee) it is 
striking that till the late 1990s, and early 2000s few global buyers had a significant direct 
presence in India—Wal Mart and Target did not have their own offices in India till as late 
as 2004/5; most buyers sourced from India indirectly through local buying houses and 
other intermediaries.  That few of the largest global buyers played any direct role in 
building deep sourcing networks among Indian producers at the start of India’s export 
surge in the mid-1980s is in contrast to the central role that such buyers or third country 
producers  (such  as  South  Korean  producers  in  Bangladesh)  historically  played  in 
initiating and channeling apparel exports from several supplier countries (Rhee 1990, 
Gibbon 1999, Bair and Gereffi 2002).   
3.5.3  Integration without Regional Trade Agreements 
 
A third factor that has driven apparel exports in many supplier countries, namely, 
the  incorporation  of  the  supplier  nation  into  major  regional  or  preferential  trade 
agreements with their main buyer countries-- such as NAFTA, CBI, EU enlargement, 
AGOA, is also absent in India’s case.  India’s recent export growth has occurred despite 
its absence from every major regional free trade agreement (RTA).  Table 5 shows a 
striking pattern. In the last decade, the fastest growing apparel exporters among the top 
15 exporting countries have been five: Mexico, Romania, Bangladesh, Turkey and of 
course, China. Apart from China, which received massive FDI from Hong Kong, Taiwan   20 
and Japan throughout the 1980s, and which along with Hong Kong had already emerged 
as a leading exporter of apparel in the late 1980s and the top exporter after 1995, the 
other four are part of a major RTA, customs union, or bilateral trade agreement. In each 
case the supplier country experienced rapid surges in the 1990s, after becoming part of its 
respective hemispheric free trade agreement -- NAFTA in 1994 in the case of Mexico, 
EU enlargement in the case of Romania, EU customs union in case of Turkey, and least 
developed country status and tariff-free entry for Bangladesh into Europe).  Thus, as 
Table 5 shows, Mexico, whose apparel exports grew at an impressive annual average 
growth rate of 17.5% between 1993 and 2003, increased its market share from barely 
0.5% in 1990 to 0.9% in 1993 to 3.2% in 2003. On average Mexico added $597 million 
per year to its apparel export value every year between 1993 and 2003 (see Table 5);   
Romania’s apparel exports grew at an annual average rate of 14% between 1993 and 
2003, and its global share rose from 0.3% in 1990 to 0.5% in 1993 to 1.8% of the world 
market in 2003; Bangladesh grew at 11% annually between 1993 and 2003, and increased 
its share from 0.6% in 1990 to 1% in 1993 and nearly 2% in 2003. Turkey similarly 
increased its market share from 3.1% to 4.4% between 1990 and 2003. India’s annual 
average growth of 5% during this period, on par with Turkey’s, without the benefit of 
FDI or the deep organizing role of global buyers, or participation in a trade-enhancing 
RTA is thus impressive.   21 
Table 5: Growth Rates of the top 15 Apparel Exporters between 1993 and 2003 
(US$ million and percentage) 
 
Country 













in Share        
(% pts) 
China  1780.5  6.27  14  23  9 
China, Hong Kong SAR  -286.2  -1.38  15.9  10.2  -5.7 
Italy  -59.0  -0.41  8.5  7.4  -1.1 
Turkey  228.0  3.83  3  4.4  1.4 
Germany  -6.9  -0.16  5  4.3  -0.7 
Mexico  597.2  17.51  0.9  3.2  2.3 
France  8.1  0.12  3.5  3.1  -0.4 
India  201.7  4.76  2.3  2.9  0.6 
USA  -69.7  -1.28  3.8  2.4  -1.4 
Belgium*  194.7  5.01    2.4   
United Kingdom  -90.6  -2.33  2.4  2  -0.4 
Indonesia  22.4  0.63  2.7  1.8  -0.9 
Romania  225.5  14.02  0.5  1.8  1.3 
Rep. of Korea  -271.2  -5.85  4.7  1.6  -3.1 
Bangladesh  250.3  10.73  1  1.6  0.6 
Source: Computed from UN Trade Statistics 
Note 1) Belgium growth rates are for 1999-2003         
        2) All values deflated by CPI index (US$) base year = 1995        
 
3.5.4   The rise of a tier of globally competitive domestic firms 
 
The final point is that this recent growth does not fit very well with standard neo-
liberal narratives of export growth being unleashed by the liberalization of the economy 
in the early 1990s. As we saw, the turnaround in apparel and textile exports was triggered 
by the deregulation of the industry in 1985 and a progressive revision of the state’s textile 
policy (in 1985, 1988, 1990, 2000 and 2003), rather than by the liberalization of trade in 
the early 1990s.  The new textile policy of 1985 was a turning point in spurring apparel 
export growth, and helped transform the capabilities of a whole tier of firms. The process 
of de-regulation that this revised policy initiated, worked in three specific ways.  (a) It 
induced cycles of investment and technical upgrading in the sector, (b) very specifically 
promoted exports and (c) diversified the sector’s fibre base. The government raised the 
upward limit on investment allowed to small and medium firms, ancillary units, and those 
investing in lagging regions. Exporters had an even freer hand—they could set up units of   22 
any  scale  at  any  location,  and  import  duty-free  machinery  and  equipment  (see 
Gangopadhyay and Krishnan 2005 for a detailed list of policy changes).  The government 
used generous subsidies, duty-drawback programs to encourage firms to establish export 
oriented units, and absorb new technology. The increased investment thus took two forms 
– capacity increases and investments in technical modernization. Between 1990 and 2003 
the average investment per firm in plant and equipment in the top-ten cohort of textile 
firms increased 43 percent in real terms (constant 1995 dollars).  In the apparel sector -- 
which was reserved for small scale firms till 2003 – mean investment per firm in plant 
and equipment increased an impressive 315% from $1.2 million in 1995 to $5.1 million 
in  2003  (in  constant  1995  dollars).
17    Two  additional  measures  of  the  rising  capital 
intensity and investment in plant, equipment and technology are illustrated in figures 4 
and 5. At the industry level, the capital labor ratio of textile and apparel firms as a whole 
trended upwards throughout the late 1980s and 1990 (Figure 4);
18  Similarly, at the firm 
level, investments in plant and equipment (as a percentage of sales) as well as gross fixed 
assets (as a percentage of sales) increased sharply in the 1990s (see Figure 5).
19 The 
average scale of firms in the textile and apparel industry thus began to increase in the late 











                                                 
17 Indeed, one of the policy changes in 1985 and again in 1991 as noted in note 14, was to raise the upward 
limit on investment allowed to small firms.   
18 These figures are computed using Annual Survey of Industries data. Capital employed is deflated using a 
weighted price series for capital constructed for the textile sector by Danish Hashim. See Hashim 2005) 
19 These are calculation for a sample of 77 textile and apparel firms for which full panel data is available 
from CMIE’s Prowess database.   23 




























































































































































Source: ASI data, capital employed deflated using a weighted price series for capital constructed by Hashim (2005) 
Figure 5: Ratio of plant and machinery to sales in a sample of 77 textile and apparel firms 1989-2003 
Measures of rising capital intensity in Indian Textiles - 1989-2003














































Source: CMIE, Prowess database   24 
These  investments  and  cycles  of  technical  upgrading  helped  transform  the 
capacities  of  a  whole  subset  of  firms,  and  with  the  government’s  generous  export 
incentive exports grew sharply.  For example, Arvind Mills, the second largest textile and 
apparel company in the country increased its exports from 12 percent of sales in 1990 to 
42  percent  of  sales  in  2003  (or  from  $15  million  to  $111  million  in  1995  constant 
dollars). Similarly, Raymond Ltd, the third largest textile and apparel group in India, 
increased  exports  from  5%  of  sales  in  1990  to  17%  of  sales  in  2003.
20  Overall,  the 
average share of exports (as a percent of total sales) in the top-ten cohort of top ten 
apparel firms has grown to more than 53% today, and in the case of the much more 
domestically oriented textiles sector, exports rose by 12 percentage points from 3 percent 
of sales in 1990 to over 15 percent in 2003 (calculated from CMIE’s Prowess database).  
 
Similarly, the reforms of 1985 also helped diversify the sector’s fibre base. This 
diversification is reflected in changing patterns of consumption at home as well in the 
composition of India’s exports. For example, the consumption of cotton yarn and fabric 
within India fell from 76% in 1985-86 to about 66% in 1999 and to just over 50% in 2003 
(Ministry of Textiles 1999, Ministry of Textiles 2005).  Though cotton-based fabric and 
garments still constitute 61% of India’s textile and apparel exports, the share of MMF-
based yarn, fabric and garments in total exports have steadily increased from 14% in 
1990 to 19% in 2003 (See Figure 6). Moreover, by 2003, nine of India’s ten largest 
textile firms listed synthetic, man-made or blended fabrics as their primary economic 
activity (Prowess database 2005).  The government’s 1985 Textile Policy thus had an 
important transformative impact, even though India’s emerging MMF market is still only 
a fourth of China’s (the top producer globally) and half of USA’s (the second largest 
producer), it has grown significantly in the last two decades (Ministry of Textiles 2000, 





                                                 
20 Calculated from CMIE’s Prowess database.   25 
 
Figure 6: Decomposition of product segment shares in India’s textile and apparel exports 1992-2003 































































Wool and Woolen textiles
 
Source: Ministry of Textiles 
 
3.5.5  Summary 
 
In sum, then, this section made two points.  First, that the domestic reforms of the 
mid-1980s were critical in triggering growth in the apparel and textile sector. Their initial 
focus on investment and technical upgrading in the textile and apparel sector created a 
tier of strong domestic firms in the spinning and apparel sector that increased investment, 
modernized their technical base, diversified their product mix and over time emerged as 
leading exporters. Trade liberalization of the 1990s deepened the processes that had the 
process of deregulation had already begun in 1985.  
 
Second,  we  also  saw  in  this  section  that  the  early  phase  of  export  growth  in 
India’s textile and apparel industry was different in important ways from the experience 
of other countries that have emerged as major apparel exporters recently.  In contrast to   26 
some of its closest competitors, India’s recent export growth was achieved with relatively 
little FDI, without a major role of foreign buyers in deeply organizing Indian supply 
networks, and without the trade-channeling effect of participation in any major regional 
trade agreements.  These data can be read in two ways.  First, that India’s export growth, 
though more rapid in the recent past, merely tracked  rising  global  growth in apparel 
exports during this period (see Ramaswamy and Gereffi 1998), and that with greater FDI, 
a deeper insertion of Indian suppliers into major global buyer networks, and participation 
in RTA’s, India’s growth would have been much faster.   
 
While this may well be the case, as many have argued in the literature (McKinsey 
2001, for example), a second reading of the data, and which I argue for in this paper, is 
that regardless of the debate over the ills or benefits of the government’s autarkic turn in 
the  late  1960s  and  1970s,  the  same  factors  that  have  contributed  to  the  slow  global 
integration  of  the  Indian  textile  and  apparel  sector,  are  also  generating  unexpected 
opportunities for the industry to upgrade itself and cultivate new sources of competitive 
advantage that, if nurtured well, have the potential to move it along a higher value-added 
and more diversified growth path of adjustment and upgrading, along with scaling up.  
 
4  Legacies of import substitution 
 
There are many criticisms of India’s protectionist phase during the 1960s through 
the 1980s.  Critics argue the government’s attempt to control and shape the textile and 
apparel industry resulted in high costs, technological obsolescence, uneconomical scales 
of operation which shackled productivity and kept the textile and apparel industry tied to 
inefficient scales of production and technologies (McKinsey 2001, Hashim 2005, World 
Bank 2000).This protectionist period shaped key legacies. 
 
There are four key legacies of this earlier period that are playing an important part 
in the transformation of the textile and apparel sector today. (1) A history of small batch 
production that was inadvertently reinforced by the government’s licensing policies, its 
reservation policies and labor laws that kept the average apparel establishment small in 
scale; (2) generalist skills centered around the ‘master tailor’ – who served as master   27 
cutter and designer and innovator and around whom garment production was organized. 
(3) A large market size which helped anchor domestic firms across the sector’s value 
chain—from the mill sector to apparel—and elicited the rise of a number of regional, 
national and sectoral support institutions including textile research agencies and export 
promotion councils.  
 
(4) India’s low labor costs and low wages, which were historically undercut by 
poor productivity.  India is generally seen as one of the lowest cost apparel producers 
globally. A recent study estimated India’s labor costs (total employment cost for labor 
across industries) to be amongst the lowest (2.024 Euro) in the world, a sixth of even 
China’s (13.88 Euro) (Economic Times, 2005), but India’s poor productivity has always 
undermined its labor cost advantage. Even in the early 1990s when Indian apparel exports 
were growing rapidly, India’s productivity lagged behind most of the major exporters of 
apparel (Table 6 and  
 
 
Table 7).  Thus, even aside from the rigidities introduced by some of India’s labor 
laws, low labor costs have never automatically added up to low production costs or low 
unit costs in Indian apparel.  This mixed cost advantage pushed many better performing 
firms to look elsewhere for advantage in the export market, as we see next.  
 

















Ladies Blouses  Dresses  Skirts  Mens' Shirts    Men’s Trousers 
Hong Kong  20.56  20.17  19.25  20.87  19.25 
Taiwan  18.89  12.44  16.63  18.18  16.12 
Thailand  16.97  12.19  20.47  19.75  13.08 
South Korea  14.59  8.77  17.54  17.39  15.55 
China  10.93  7.83  13  13.96  6.71 
India  10.18  6.25  9.62  9.12  6.84 
Source: S.R. Khanna, 1993, The Challenge  of Global Competition in the 1990s. ICRIER Memo.     28 
 
 
Table 7:  Comparative Labor Costs in the Apparel Industry, 2000 
Country   Average hourly wage in US$ 
United States  11.2 
Germany  10 
Hong Kong, China  5.1 
Rep. Korea  5.1 
Slovenia  2.7 
Mexico  1.8 
South Africa  1.6 
Malaysia  1.4 
El Salvador  1.1 
Mauritius  0.9 
Slovakia  0.9 
China  0.9 
India   0.7 
Sri Lanka  0.6 
Indonesia  0.2 
Pakistan  0.2 
Bangladesh  0.2 
   
Source: ILO 2003, EU 2003, cf. UNCTAD 2005 
 
 
5  Emerging Firm Strategies  
 
Based on these histories, three major paths of global integration are discernable 
among Indian textile and clothing firms that have successfully inserted themselves in the 
export market in recent years. 
5.1  Flexible, small-batch production  
 
As  we  have  seen,  the  state’s  licensing  regime  and  labor  policies  historically 
pushed the Indian apparel industry toward small scales of operation and small runs rather 
than high turnover, low-margin volume production. These small scales of operation had 
three implications for how the sector developed.  They  forced firms to learn how to 
manage small-batch production and variability in orders, efficiently. At the same time, 
small  capacities  of  Indian  apparel  firms  oriented  their  exports  toward  the  European 
market early on, rather than the US -- where orders were much larger, especially by   29 
discount retailers like Sears, Target and Walmart.  On the one hand, this prevented the 
early Walmartization of the Indian textile and apparel industry, and on the other hand it 
created  more  stable,  often  learning  and  feedback  intensive  ties  between  the  Indian 
suppliers and their European buyers.  As the literature has documented, the links between 
Indian apparel exporters in the 1980s and 1990s tended to be with small and medium 
sized wholesalers and retailers or their buying agents, than with large chains.  Most of 
these buyers themselves could not take the risk of placing large orders per style – most 
sought 2500 to 4000 pieces per order, rather than 100,000 pieces.  At the same time they 
also sought flexibility and the ability on the part of their suppliers to handle fast-changing 
orders of variable designs and specifications (Vishal interview, 2005, Pacific Apparel 
Exports, Interview, 2005).  Thus, a whole cohort of apparel exporters who came on board 
in the 1980s and 1990s bypassed the biggest clothing chains in Europe and the US, and 
instead developed relatively longer term, often feed-back intensive relational ties with 
their  buyers  (Tewari  1999).    Over  time,  many  exporters  became  progressively  quite 
proficient at handling complex designs in small-runs, multiple product lines and volatility 
in orders cost-effectively.  These traits are especially valuable in an environment where 
intense competition, uncertainty and fragmentation have characterized demand – as it has 
since the 1980s – and where customization, variability, good quality and low costs are no 
longer niche strategies, but are widely demanded by buyers.   
 
When Indian suppliers diversified into the US market in the 1990s, who would 
one expect to be their major buyers?  Not surprisingly, firms which themselves sought 
smaller runs of higher value products of variable designs have been the key buyers of 
Indian apparel in the US market.  Buyers like Gap, Banana Republic, Liz Claiborne, Ann 
Taylor, Abercombie and Fitch and department stores such as Dillards, and JC Penny are 
some of the prominent US buyers of Indian apparel today, and began sourcing from India 
much earlier than mass-distributors and discount retailers like Wal Mart, K-Mart, Target 
and  others  who  are  only  now  intensifying  their  procurement  from  India.    Indeed,  in 
interviews conducted in three apparel hubs across the country between 2000 and 2005, 
Indian firms themselves routinely reported preferring to work with buyers who placed 
smaller orders than with bulk buyers like Wal Mart. Discount retailers like Wal Mart   30 
‘offer too low margins,” are too footloose and offer little room to learn and grow, many 
said.  Few firms expressed a willingness to take the risk of making large investments in 
capacity increases to supply firms like Wal Mart for margins that were far too low to 
allow  room  for  growth.  Working  with  buyers  who  place  smaller  orders  of  variable 
designs has also led to an improvement in the unit value realization of Indian suppliers.  
 
A central part of the competitive advantage of good performing firms that are 
supplying to higher value, relatively up-market specialty buyers such as Gap, Banana 
Republic, J. Crew, is their ability to contribute to design -- not only in preparing samples 
and prototypes, but in translating concepts into varieties of finished designs, as well as 
introducing designs of their own.  Several firms have their own design departments and 
in the last five years have begun to work closely with overseas designers and/or agents. 
One knitwear firm that supplies to specialty stores in the UK and US reported how they 
had co-developed and produced a knit polo shirts for buyers like Firetrap and Diesel—of 
designs that required “100-160 different operations to implement.” Manufactured at Rs. 
$22  per  T-shirt,  these  items  were  retailed  at  $80  at  key  stores,  including,  Harrods 
(Eastman Interview Tirrupur, 2005).
21  As the chairman of another leading textile and 
apparel company (Raymond’s) put it in a recent interview, “China will be a large volume 
player [in textiles] while India will always be a higher quality lower volume player…” 
(Singhania in the Hindu, 2005).  While it is important not to obscure China’s lead in a 
range of high quality product segments and its superior productivity, this example in fact 
illustrates a broader trend toward higher value apparel exports by a growing subset of 
Indian firms and is reflected in the rising unit values of several products in India’s export 
basket as we see the Figure 7 and Table 8. Figure 7 shows the recent evolution of India 
and China’s (inflation adjusted) unit values of cotton trousers and shorts (for men and 
boys and women and girls) between 1995 and 2003.  Table 8 summarizes broader data 
for India’s unit values in six of its leading categories in apparel exports. 
 
                                                 
21 See also Palpaceur (2004) who reported in a recent study on sourcing patterns of French retailers and 
how some who source from India reported having chosen their Indian supplier because of their design 
ability (Palpaceur, 2004). 
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Figure 7:  India and China’s unit values (Inflation adjusted dollars per unit)  
 
          Men’s/boys cotton trousers and shorts (woven)   Women’s/girls cotton trousers and shorts (woven) 



































































































































































                       
HS 
Code  Product category  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Trend 
610910 
T-shirts, singlets of cotton, 
knitted  3.1  3.0  3.6  3.0  3.2  3.0  3.0  2.7  2.9  -0.04 
620630 
Womens/girls blouses, shirts, 
cotton, woven  4.2  4.1  3.9  3.8  3.7  3.4  3.4  3.5  3.5  -0.10 
610510  Mens/boys shirts, cotton, knitted  3.3  1.1  4.0  3.8  4.0  3.8  3.7  3.6  3.4  0.12 
610610 
Womens/girls blouses, shirts, 
cotton, knitted  3.1  3.1  3.4  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.4  2.5  2.5  -0.11 
620342 
Mens/boys trousers and shorts, 
of cotton, woven  3.0  2.9  3.0  3.6  3.7  3.9  4.0  4.1  4.5  0.20 
610831 
Womens/girls nightdresses of 
cotton, knitted  2.5  2.4  3.0  2.7  2.8  2.7  2.7    2.5   
620462 
Womens/girls trousers, shorts, of 
cotton, woven  3.2  3.1  3.3  3.6  3.4  3.7  3.6  4.2  4.1  0.12 
                       
  
Share of India's total apparel 
exports  62%  64%  61%  59%  53%  53%  57%  57%  56%    
Source: Calculated from Comtrade Data; CPI base =1995                 
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As Table 8 shows, unit values of three of India’s rapidly growing export items, 
mens/boys cotton trousers and shorts (non-knitted), women’s cotton trousers and shorts 
(non-knitted) and mens/boys cotton knitted shirts – each registered increases over the last 
eight years.  The unit value of mens/boys cotton trousers increased from $3.0 per unit to 
$4.5 per unit in real dollars (constant 1995) between 1995 and 2003, and women’s cotton 
trousers/shorts and men’s cotton knitted shirts each added 12 cents per year to their unit 
value between 1995 and 2003 (real 1995 dollars).  Furthermore, Table 9 shows that the 
growth in trade value has continued after the removal of quotas—so far, at least in the US 
market (USITC Data 2005).
22 
 
Table 9:  Post-MFA Growth of India's Apparel Exports to the US, January to May 2005 (Selected 
product categories) 














8437  Men's/boys' shirts of knitted or 
crocheted textile fabrics  157,521  65,565  103,549  57.90% 
8414  Men's/boys' trousers, shorts etc of 
woven textile materials  141,685  61,764  85,467  38.40% 
8425  Women's/girls' skirts and divided 
skirts of woven textile fabric   132,716  70,390  178,017  152.90% 
8426 
Women's trousers, overalls, 
breeches, shorts etc. of woven textile 
fabrics 
114,833  60,449  68,039  12.60% 
8454  T-shirts, singlets, tank-tops etc of 
knitted or crocheted textile fabric  51,611  21,514  41,680  93.70% 
All  All apparel export categories  2,357,070  984,291  1,362,117  38.40% 
           
Source: United States International Trade Commission       
 
It  is  significant  --  and  surprising  –  to  see  the  rapidity  with  which  design  has 
emerged as a source of competitive advantage in Indian apparel exports in recent years—
                                                 
22 USITC data are not measured in the HS system. Hence the discrepancy between the categories for which 
India’s unit values are calculated (from UN data) in Table 8 and figures for India’s exports to the US from 
the US International Trade Commission in Table 9.   33 
especially given the relatively ‘young’ export history of Indian apparel and the general 
image of low quality often associated with some Indian apparel exports.  As one firm 
who  is  a  major  supplier  for  several  European  and  US  specialty  stores  such  as  Nike 
explained, “When items have complicated designs with complex patterns, many fabrics, a 
variety  of  colors  --  you  have  to  break  them  down.  Many  different  operations  and 
techniques  are  required,  you  have  to  figure  them  out”  (Gokuldas  Exports  Interview 
2005).  When buyers have such items, many of them tend to come to India, this firm said, 
rather than going to Bangladesh or China.  “A Chinese firm would probably refuse the 
order. In their system, the more complicated the design, the more complicated the line 
gets, and lower the efficiency. This complicates the bottom line. It is not worth their 
while” – especially if the volumes are small (Gokuldas Exports, Interview, 2005). Why, 
then, would an Indian firm be willing to take the order?  Why are buyers like Nike and 
others turning to India for the production of items with complex designs – e.g., shorts and 
casual  trousers  with  many  pockets,  different  colors,  designs  with  all  sorts  of 
complications; jackets using multiple fabrics and motifs? 
 
  The answer, in part has to do with an important legacy of the sector’s industrial 
organization—the historically small average scales of operation in Indian apparel created 
the conditions for the preservation of generalist skills—of the master tailor—at the heart 
of  the  Indian  apparel  industry.    These  general  purpose  skills  allow  complexity  to  be 
handled cost-effectively and flexibly given that the rigidities of too narrow a division of 
labor  are  absent  The  firm  mentioned  above  explained  that  Indian  firms  are  used  to 
handling small-runs, and “We have skilled manpower available cheaply”… [what did he 
mean  by  “skilled  manpower?”]…“We  have  tailors  who  have  the  ability  and  the 
willingness to do complex designs. They have been doing it for years.  In China the line 
workers are industrial workers – not tailors.  Their production line needs relatively simple 
designs that can be easily broken down and mass produced” (Interview, Gokuldas, 2005). 
The flatter division of labor associated with small operations, short runs and variable 
designs, has both, created a demand for general-purpose skills at the core of the work 
organization, as well helped maintain craft-like skills and a generalized design sensibility 
within a key segment of the apparel workforce.     34 
But it is precisely these two traits of the Indian apparel sector – namely, the small 
scales of operation, and the proliferation of the institution of the tailor in the industry’s 
production  structure  –  that  have  been  widely  criticized  as  impeding  growth,  stunting 
exports  and  keeping  productivity  low  (McKinsey  2001,  Hashim  2005,  Besley  and 
Burgess 2004,  Kathuria and Bhardwaj, Elberi, Hertel and Martin 2003).  A recent study 
by McKinsey in fact makes an explicit case that Indian productivity in apparel is sub-par 
internationally not because Indian apparel firms are unaware of frontier technologies, nor 
because they do not have access to the latest technology [because a subset of Indian firms 
have adopted them], but because their scale of operation on average is too small to allow 
them  to  profitably  adopt  these  technologies  (McKinsey  2001).  The  McKinsey  study 
further links small scales with the dominance of the tailor in the industry as causes of the 
sector’s low productivity (KcKinsey 2001, Bannerjee and Duflo 2004)—just the opposite 
of the dynamic outlined above.  Clearly, the scale issue operates at multiple—apparently 
contradictory—levels.    The  same  factor  that  at  one  level  can  be  debilitating  for 
productivity growth, can, at another level open up new and quite distinct paths to value 
addition. 
 
My point here is not to question the importance of raising labor productivity in the 
Indian apparel sector, nor to dispute the importance of scale.  The point rather is to call 
attention  to  the  contradictory  effects  of  the  history  of  small  size  and  small  batch 
production in Indian apparel, and to argue that alongside the purported down-sides of the 
small scales of production, this same history has produced important capabilities in the 
Indian apparel industry, which if nurtured and developed can provide Indian garment 
firms with a distinctive additional path to upgrading.  Currently there is a lot of pressure 
on Indian apparel firms to increase their production capacities and to scale up to compete 
with countries like China, especially after the removal of quotas.  And indeed, as we saw, 
the average scale of production of the Indian apparel and textile industry has been going 
up in the past half decade. While scaling up is important  – and is ongoing –  India’s 
history  of  small-batch  production  simultaneously  offers  an  additional  opportunity  for 
firms to capture the benefits that their small runs afford by turning to the production of   35 
higher value-added, higher quality, customized apparel of complex and variable designs 
efficiently.   
 
5.2  Scaling up  
 
That a growing number of Indian textile and apparel firms are leveraging their 
traditional capacity to handle small runs and variable designs to move toward the flexible 
production of higher value, customized products, does not mean that Indian textile and 
apparel firms are not scaling up, or producing for volume-buyers like Wal Mart, or facing 
the  growing  pressure  on  margins  by  ramping  up  production  volumes.    Despite  the 
assumed reluctance of Indian textile and apparel firms to scaling up in the face of India’s 
rigid labor laws and lack of an exit policy, they have invested over $700 million in new 
equipment, new mills and products and expected to spend $2.5 billion more by the end of 
2005 (Business Week Online, 2004).
23   
 
The average scale of production in the Indian textile and garment industry has 
been rapidly inching upward in the decade leading up to the removal of quotas.  Three 
features are striking in this regard:  First, it was aided by the progressive liberalization of 
restrictions  on  capacity  increases  by  the  government  starting  in  the  mid-1980s  and 
continuing through the 1990s and early 2000s. As we noted, mean investment per firm in 
plant and machinery increased significantly throughout the 1990s. Second, there has been 
significant forward integration by yarn-makers and spinning mills into garments.  For 
example, Arvind Mills, the largest producer of blends and denim in the country and the 
3
rd largest denim producer globally till recently supplied fabric to virtually every major 
clothing  brand  in  the  world  –  Levis,  Gap,  Dockers  and  so  on.  Three  years  ago  it, 
integrated forward into jeans and T-shirts, investing more than $30 million in 10 new 
factories to increase its apparel sales (Interview, Ahmedabad 2005, Business India 2005). 
The  firm  has  set  up  several  joint  ventures  in  the  area  of  blended  fabrics,  and  has 
                                                 
23 Though a majority of Indian textile and apparel firms have waited till recently to increase capacity in the 
wake of the removal of quotas – and some are still waiting and watching (Interviews, e.g, Karle Exports, 
Bangalore 2005), the largest Indian textile firms have made significant investments to increase their scales 
of operation in recent years.   36 
introduced its own brands in the domestic and export market including ‘Ruf-and-Tuf’ 
jeans for the mass domestic market. Raymonds, a Mumbai-based firm, and one of the 
oldest and largest producers of suiting and shirting fabric in the country, invested in two 
large, highly sophisticated, state of the art formal suit and bottom’s factories in Bangalore 
in 2003-4. Even before the plants were fully commissioned, Japanese retailers had placed 
orders for their entire capacity for two  years (an unusual development given the low 
levels of penetration of India’s suppliers in the Japanese apparel marker). 
 
Third, there is a growing trend of backward integration by small and medium 
knitwear  and  garment  exporters  into  yarn  making,  and  significant  investments  in  the 
adoption of new technologies by firms at every segment of the value chain.  For example, 
Tiruppur, which has been celebrated for the past two decades as a vibrant small-firm 
based knitwear export cluster can no longer be considered a predominantly small scale 
cluster, as the Chairman of the Tiruppur Exporters Association recently noted. “Firms 
have been aggressively modernizing in the last five years, investing in the latest stitching, 
pattern making, cutting, embroidery, and dyeing machines.  If I buy one CAD machine 
today it costs me Rs.12.5 million; this itself is me well beyond the investment limit for 
small scale units.  At least 30 garment exporters have set up their own yarn-making mills.  
The equipment is state of the art, and costly. None of the mills are small in scale. So, 
Tiruppur is no longer a town of small scale producers – except perhaps some job-working 
garment  converters.”
24  (Interview,  Mr.  Subramaniam,  Tirupur  Exporters  Association, 
April 25, 2005). 
 
Finally, firms are investing in what some have called “manufacturing services” 
(Berger  et. al. 1997).  Many firms are adopting  IT-driven production process control 
systems, as well as productivity enhancing audits—particularly energy audits.  Noting 
that energy costs generally add up to 11-12% of total production costs, compared with 6-
7% in direct labor costs, many firms reported in field interviews that the rationalization of 
                                                 
24 By some accounts, about 45-50% of all the knitwear firms in Tiruppur are converters (Nair, Interview 
April 28, 2005—many of these may be small in scale, so the disappearance of the small firm may be more 
illusion than fact.  
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energy  consumption  was  often  the  first,  and  most  important  step  to  cutting  costs 
(Interviews, Bangalore 2005, Tiruppur 2002, 2005).  Some firms reported savings of up 
to 30-40% in energy costs as a result of these measures (Interview Precot Mills, 2002).  
Many firms have turned to captive gas-fired plants (especially the larger firms such as 
Gokuldas, Karle, Orient Crafts, Raymonds, Interviews, 2005) while clustered firms such 
as in Tiruppur, especially in industrial parks, have set up captive and dedicated sources of 
power.   
 
Rationalization  of  energy  use  and  attempts  to  lower  energy  costs  are  closely 
related  to  automation.    Automation,  and  the  deployment  of  extensive  electronic 
production tracking systems as well as statistical process control systems to monitor work 
flows, is associated with efforts by apparel and textile firms to raise productivity and 
lower wastage, cut down-time, reduce rejection rates, as well as to ensure consistency.  
Automation seems to be as important to firms that produce high volumes-low-margin 
customers as to those who are investing in design-intensive operations.  
 
 In firms that are deploying flexible production systems and are focused on small 
runs  of  high  value  products  of  variable  designs,  automation  is  often  skill-enhancing 
(Applebaum 2004).  Even as skill-biased technical change pares down the workforce, the 
existing workforce needs to be better trained.  As mentioned earlier, this is reflected in 
reports  across  Tiruppur,  Bangalore  and  Chennai  of  firms  that  are  paying  higher  than 
average wages to retain skilled workers, and where – as in Tiruppur – the fastest growing 
non-production  investment  in  the  region  is  in  the  development  of  the  city’s  training 
infrastructure  (Interview,  Chairman,  Tiruppur  Exporters  Association,  2005).  In  firms 
such as these where profitability has been rising in recent years, technical change seems 
to be accompanied by rising wages and greater worker training.  In future work it would 
be  useful  to  compare  firms  selling  to  different  kinds  of  buyers  with  respect  to  this 
relationship.  Finally,  in  many  cases  automation  and  the  adoption  of  production 
monitoring technology appears to also be closely associated with the procurement by 
firms of quality, labor and environmental certifications such as ISO 9000-1, ISO 14000, 
SA 8000 and the Oekotex label.  Though outside the scope of this paper, it is important to   38 
note that this adoption of global standards has been associated with a market widening 
and  unit  value  enhancing  effect  in  some  emergent  strands  of  the  literature  on  Indian 
textiles (e.g., Century Mills ) and related sectors (see Robins and Roberts 1997, Schmitz 
2004, Debroy 2005, Tewari 2005). The mainstream view however continued to be that 
stringent international standards often act as non-tariff barriers (RIS Policy briefs 2003). 
 
5.3  ‘Customized mass production’ 
 
India’s past strengths are shaping in powerful  ways the direction of its future 
comparative advantage – For example, home furnishing and textiles is emerging as a 
major growth sector of India’s exports in the last year, and especially in the first few 
months after quota removal (See Table 10).  This surge in the growth of home furnishings 
relies  in  very  important  ways  on  the  diversity  of  local  fabrics  available  in  India, 
especially handlooms, cotton, silks and blends.  The nurturing of a deeply rooted textiles 
base in the past, and the strength of cotton in the mix of the India’s rich fiber base, are 
now being leveraged by entrepreneurs who are combining local, high quality fabrics with 
new designs, novel product development strategies and modern technologies to cater to 
new export markets. 
 
The example of Himmatsingka Seide Limited (HSL), a Bangalore based top of 
the line exporter of high-quality silk fabrics and home furnishings illustrates well the 
dynamics at the high end of this trajectory. HSL was incorporated in 1985 – just after the 
initial deregulation of the textile industry and at a time when apparel and textile exports 
were first taking off.  HSL is situated in a green-field site on the outskirts of Bangalore—
a peri-urban location that is becoming the hub of new textile and apparel investments.
25 
HSL is a high value niche player. Though small in terms of sales -- only $34 million in 
2003 -- when compared to the largest textile firms in the country with more than $350 
                                                 
25 Most of the new integrated mills and apparel firms employing state of the art technology are located on 
the fringes of Bangalore --  away from the so-called old centers of textile production (in Mumbai, Chennai 
and Ahmedabad) or as some put it, away from the sites of the ‘old industrial relations’(Interview, Bharatiya 
International,  Delhi  2003).  Greenfield  sites  provide  easy  access  to  the  local  rural  workforce,  mostly 
women. 
   39 
million in sales, it is one of the most profitable companies with operating profit margins 
consistently between 40%-46% for the last decade (HSL Interview and Annual Report 
2005). 
Table 10:  Post-MFA Growth of India’s Textile Exports to the US – Selected Categories 
 






Change    
SITC 
No.  Category  In 1,000 Dollars 
YTD2004 
- 
YTD2005    
6584  Bedlinen (bed, table, kitchen, 










6541  Woven fabric of silk and silk 




6589  Made-ups (n.e.s.) of textile 
materials  80,888  32,557  35,695  10%  India 
ranks 5th 




6583  Blankets and traveling rugs 
(not electric)  20,265  8,057  10,759  34%  India 
ranks 5th 
6539  Woven pile, chenile fabrics of 




   Total - (Above 7)  951,572  372,737  464,245  25%    
   Others  691,764  283,591  315,587  11%    
   Total Textiles  1,643,336  656,328  779,832  19%    
Source: United States International Trade Commission        
 
 
HSL has a narrow focus – it focuses predominantly on home furnishings (curtains 
and upholstery) of silk for the high end export market.
26 It is almost entirely vertically 
integrated  - apart from filament yarn and silk waste which are imported from China, 
every aspect of the production process – from the processing of the yarn, to designing and 
weaving and finishing of the fabric is carried out in-house in a two-million-meters-per- 
annum  capacity  plant  with  115  computerized  looms  (the  largest  silk  manufacturing 
facility in India).  Yet, despite its integrated facilities, the company’s central focus is on 
                                                 
26  HSL’s  clients  include,  Jab  Joseph  Anstoetz,  Germany,  Zimmer  +  Rhode,  Germany,  Christian 
Fischbacher, Nobilis, France, Ralph Lauren Home and Robert Allen in the US among others   40 
the design and rapid delivery of small batches of highly customized home-furnishing 
fabric that fetch high realization rates.  With typical runs of 120m to 150m per customer, 
HSL’s  unit  values  of  its  custom-designed  products  are  about  $US  20  per  meter  on 
average – about 60% higher than the industry mean (Interview, HSL, 2005 and HSL 
company documents).  These $20/m products are retailed at $100-$120 by its clients in 
the EU and US.  Ninety percent of these designs are done in-house in what the firm calls 
its  highly  technically  sophisticated  “design  kitchen”  where  the  company  uses 
sophisticated process control systems and computerized facilities to mix and match and 
develop its finely detailed and finished products. The company, with 650 employees, and 
huge market capitalization of $160 million (nearly 5 times its annual sales of $34 million) 
HSL  has a portfolio of 20,000 products, and introduces 2000 new products per year, on 
average.  (Interview, HSL, Bangalore, 2005).  
 
Given  how  heavily  the  company  relies  on  design  skills,  quality  control  and 
technology,  HSL  has  a  highly  skilled  workforce.  HSL’s  labor  costs  (total  cost  to 
company) are on average 2-4 times higher than the industry norm: Rs.14,000 ($320) per 
month for skilled production workers, Rs. 24,000 ($550) per month  for textile engineers, 
and Rs.12,000 ($275) per month for the rest of the production workforce.  The average 
wage in the textile industry is Rs. 5-7000 ($115-$160) per month at the high end, and 
$40-$70 on average for production workers (Interview HSL, 2005, Company data). Yet, 
despite high costs, HSL is one of the most profitable firms in the industry as we saw.  Its 
flexible  production  structure  and  high  position  in  the  value  chain,  good  performance 
appears to overwhelm its production costs.  Ninety percent of the company’s product is 
exported, 48% to the EU, 34% to the US and the remainder to other countries.   
 
Resembling a pattern seen in most of the leading textile and apparel firms in the 
past decade, HSL has recently become inserted in the domestic market. Anticipating a 
tightening  of  competition  post  MFA,  and  pressure  on  margins  given  poor  consumer 
spending in Europe and the US in the past few years, HSL launched its own brand – 
Atmosphere – through five dedicated retail outlets in four of India’s largest metros.  Its 
next steps are to open  similar stores in high-end market segments of  other emerging   41 
markets – Brazil, Mexico, Hong Kong and others. Its next step involves a move into 
value added made-ups from fabrics, including high end apparel.  It recently entered into 
collaborations with a high end Italian bed-linen designer and retailer to market brand-
name  designer  bed-linen  (packaged  sets)  in  top-end  specialty  stores  across  Europe  
(Interviews, HSL, Bangalore, 2005).    
 
At the other end from HSL are companies like Welspun India Limited (WIL) 
Asia’s largest, and the world’s fifth largest, Terry towel producer.  Both HSL and WIL 
are vertically integrated companies, but while HSL strenuously distinguishes itself from 
the Wart Mart model (“we don’t sell to Wal Mart; we sell to Ralph Lauren Home”), 
WIL’s aim is to be the largest mass manufacturer of made-ups.  It wants to “replace US 
home-textiles giants Pillowtex and West Point Stevens as the largest home-furnishing 
manufacturers” and is committed to making the investments that it will take to do so 
(Asian Textiles Journal, 2005).  It is already one of Wal Mart’s largest Indian suppliers.  
A part of the Welspun group of Companies, a diversified business house owned by the 
Goenka  family,  WIL  began  operations  in  1985  (the  same  year  that  the  New  Textile 
Policy was introduced) with a POY texturizing plant.  In 1993 it integrated forward into 
Terry towels; two years later it integrated backwards into cotton spinning; four years later 
it formed  a joint venture with an Italian company to manufacture bathrobes for export 
markets, and five years after that, in 2004, it set up an integrated bed-sheet/bed-linen 
project (see Figure 8).  A supplier to 12 of the top 20 retailers of the world, its primary 
buyers  are  Wal  Mart,  K-Mart,  Target,  J.C.  Penny,  Tommy  Hilfiger,  Shopko,  Calvin 
Klein, among others—just the opposite of HSL’s.  In recent years WIL has invested over 
$323 million to increase its capacity from 11,500 tons of towels per year to 24,500 tons 
per  year, and diversify  into bed-linen and other made-ups. Just like HSL, it has also 
launched its own domestic brand, ‘Spaces.’ In the next three years, alongside exports, it 
plans to invest nearly $12 million to open 125 retail stores across India to market its 
domestic line of made-ups and bed-sheets (see Business India 2005). 
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Source: Welspun India Limited – company website 
 
In between firms like these are smaller players whose export and domestic market 
strategies mirror the diversity that is emerging among India’s largest firms.  For example, 
a medium sized Bangalore based exporters of garments (the Choudhury group) used to 
“produce whatever orders came our way – shirts, pants, kids wear “– till two years ago 
(Interview, 2005).  The company, which has 1500 machines in 10 units of 150 each, 
followed a ‘turnover’ based model – low prices, substantial runs, but with neither the 
massive scales needed to make the ‘high turnover low margins’ model be profitable, nor 
the work organization to deal with variable designs, the company changed strategies in 
the early 2000s. Feeling the pressure on prices and the squeeze margins (which were 
about 5%), the company decided to move out of the turnover business, and into a niche 
where large volume producers like China and Bangladesh were not threats.  It chose 
fashion-based women’s and girls’ tops and clothing which had a dominance of hand-
crafted finishes and operations (embroidery, and other labor-intensive processes).  While 
it  modernized  and  automated  some  of  its  production  processes  (button  holding, 
hemming), it intensified the use of skilled workers overall. The company now produces 
small batches (not more than 3-5000 per order) of women’s fashion-wear for retailers in 
the EU and US market.  The company’s profits have risen to 40%, and sales have gone   43 
up  (Interview,  Vishal,  Chowdhury  group,  2005).  Its  biggest  worries  are  shortages  of 
skilled workers, and high turnover (about 10-15%) which puts pressure on turn-around 
times, quality and consistency. 
 
A  second  example  is  of  a  large  CMT  (cut-make-trim)  exporter  also  based  in 
Bangalore  (4000  machines)  who  similarly  pared  down  its  product  focus  (shirts  and 
bottoms), and turned to automation and design to improve its bottom line. One the one 
hand, it adopted extensive process control systems and quality circles to track production, 
cut wastage and improve productivity in its CMT operations; on the other hand it began 
to explore partnerships with freelance designers in New York to collaborate to design 
medium-end shirts and bottoms for retailers (such as Dillards and others) - Interview, 
Karle Group, Bangalore 2005, see also Singhal, 2004, for a general discussion of the 
evolving structure of Indian apparel supply chains). 
 
Clearly then, the theme of leveraging small production runs, incorporating design, 
and technology, especially IT-based production services, while scaling up are some of the 
patterns that cut across the emerging firm strategies in the textile and apparel industry 
today.   
 
We can now sum up several common patterns run across the recent trajectories of 
top performers in Indian textiles and apparel exports:  (a) a background in textiles, (b) 
recent  forward  integration  into  value  added  apparel  or  value  added  fabrics  (technical 
textiles),  (c)  strong  use  of  technology,  especially  software  based  systems  monitoring 
protocols, and other production and process tracking systems to streamline production, 
(d)  an  emergent  focus  on  design  (and  in  some  cases  product  development),  (e)  and 
institutional  investments  in  western  markets—especially  in  the  strategic  purchase  of 
small design and distribution networks in the  major markets in the US and EU (See 
Tewari 2004).  Indeed, nearly all the major exporters have rapidly developed a global 
strategy,  involving  not  just  exports,  but  (modest)  overseas  investments  in  asset 
development (in distribution, design and manufacturing), including technical tie-ups with 
western  partners  in  the  production  of    the  next  generation  of  textile  products  -   44 
particularly,  high  value  technical  textiles  (see  Tewari  2004).    For  example,  Madura 
Garments recently signed a technical collaboration with Outlast Technologies of the US 
to develop a new range of “smart garments” under the Van Heusen label, including the 
launch of “cool pants” for the Indian market (Business Standard 2005, Jayaswal 2005).   
 
6  Blurring of the boundaries between domestic and export markets 
 
In addition to the patterns above, four additional factors are transforming supplier 
capacities  in  ways  that  are  blurring  the  boundaries  between  firms  producing  for  the 
domestic market and those producing for exports. (1) Deepening local capabilities in the 
area  of  logistics  (warehousing  and  customized  tracking  systems),  (2)  the  surprising 
emergence  of  design  as  a  source  of  competitive  advantage  in  Indian  apparel;  (3)  the 
growing importance of outward-bound investment by Indian apparel firms as a way to 
counter  the  exclusion  of  India  from  all  major  regional  trade  agreements  and  the 
advantage of tariff free entry into major markets that many of India’s competitors enjoy 
(Mexico in the US markets, Turkey and Bangladesh in EU market, Eastern Europe and 
EU  enlargement  that  Indian  exporters  feel  many  feel),  and  (4)  a  growing  focus  on 
domestic  brands.  In  this  regard  a  new  development  is  the  increasingly  key  role  that 
organized  retail  is  playing  in  structuring  the  Indian  domestic  market,  reinforced  in 
particular by rising incomes and growing purchasing power among consumers in rapidly 
growing sectors of the economy such as information technology and business process 
outsourcing (BPO).   
6.1  Domestic brands, design and retail 
 
Virtually all the top exporters have introduced their own brands in the domestic 
market  and  are  aggressively  positioning  themselves  within  segments  of  the  domestic 
market.
27  They are developing their supply networks, carving out their own distribution 
networks,  seeking  distinctive  niches  and  generally  staking  out  their  terrain  in  the 
domestic market to consolidate their first mover advantage before the government opens 
up the retail sector to foreign direct investment.  Though some domestic clothing brands 
                                                 
27 These trends began about a decade to fifteen years ago.  See Tewari (1999).    45 
have been around for decades (e.g, Zodiac, Monte Carlo, Raymonds, Grasim, Vimal), 
and several franchised foreign brands (especially in men’s clothing) had began to surface 
in the Indian market nearly fifteen years ago (e.g., Van Heusen, Peter England, Lacoste), 
the rise of domestic brands as an explicit growth strategy began a decade ago with the 
highly  successful  launch  of  Colour  Plus,  a  ready-to-wear  mid-market  label  of  the 
Ambattur  Clothing  company,  a  leading  exporter  of  apparel  to  top  end  US  buyers 
(Interview, Chennai 2001). Soon after the launch, Raymond’s, one of India’s foremost 
textile and apparel companies bought Colour Plus, and popularized it across the country 
through its dedicated chain of retail stores. A second brand, ‘Pantaloon’ emerged around 
the same time, in the same way (see Mukherjee and Patel 2005 for details). Since then, 
nearly all major exporters and domestic manufacturers have sought to combine a focus of 
the domestic branded garment segment and an explicit retail strategy.  Welspun recently 
allotted equity shares and warrants
28 to raise funds for brand development, and retail 
investments in India as well as international distribution alliances, and plans to open 125 
retail stores over the next three years (Business India, 2005; Welspun Annual Report 
2005).    
 
Orient  Craft,  a  Delhi  based  garment  exporter  also  launched  an  aggressive 
expansion  program  to  launch  its  own  labels  in  India  and  in  the  US  (Goyal  2005).  
Raymonds recently announced plans to invest in both the backward and forward linked 
ends of its business. At the back end it is investing $41 million to enter into a 50:50 
venture with Cotonificio Honegger, a part of Gruppo Zambaitti, a high fashion Italian 
cotton textile group to make high value shirt fabric, and at the other end has set up two 
new  facilities for US$ 14 million near Bangalore to produce branded shirts and demin 
wear (Chatterjee 2005). At the same time it proposes to invest nearly $0.2 billion in 2005 
to set expand its retail and distribution network within and outside the country – adding 
more stores under its high end Monzoni brand, increasing its Park Avenue showrooms 
and  “adding  20-30  retail  stores  every  year  for  the  next  few  years”  (Chatterjee  2005, 
quoting a Raymond’s official).   
 
                                                 
28 At a face value of Rs. 10 and at a premium of Rs. 120 (Business India 2005).   46 
Similarly, Arvind Mills, the large denim producer that recently diversified into 
jeans, designer T-shirts and casual shirts, not only has developed dedicated brands for its 
various quality products at different price points, but has developed a novel distribution 
strategy to retail low-cost jeans to the rural Indian consumer.  Its Ruf-n-Tuf line of jeans 
priced at less than Rs. 300 ($7), uses the preference among many consumers for home-
tailored clothes and the ubiquity of tailors across the Indian landscape, to market ready-to 
assemble kits of jean parts through local tailors that are locally stitched according to the 
size and specification of the buyer.  After going through a period of learning when the 
brand almost did not survive, the company successfully re-launched its rural brand again 
in early 2005 (Interveiw, Ahmedabad, January 2005).  The rising importance of branded 
segments in the domestic market combined with the pressure of import-competition, is 
blurring the boundaries between exports and domestic production in countries with large 
home markets, such as India.  Processes such as these are thus creating demand in the 
domestic market for the same traits that are valued in demanding export markets. 
 
All of these developments in retail are further being reinforced by the rapid rise of 
malls across urban  India. With the proliferation of malls, the establishment of theme 
stores, franchises and the rise of hyper-market formats (such as Pantaloons’ Big Bazaar), 
demand  for  store  space  for  ready  made  apparel  is  surging  (see  Mukherjee  and  Patel 
2005).  These shifts in retail are fuelling the demand for good quality and trendy apparel, 
which is in turn deepening the importance of design in the domestic market.  Indeed, the 
rise of a younger class of middle-class consumers, spawned by the booming BPO and IT 
sector, has led to burgeoning demand for locally designed, ready to wear clothing in 
Indian  metros.    As  many  recent  surveys  have  noted,  with  good  salaries,  strong  peer 
pressure and the growing availability of brands across product categories, spending in 
retail is being driven by the youth segment in large and mid-sized metros (Bhushan and 
Anand,  2005).  Sales  of  cellphones,  branded  garments,  high-end  jeans,  shoes,  music 
systems, bikes and entertainment are driven by new consumers in their early 20s. As a 
manager  in  a  mall  (Shopper’s  Stop)  recently  noted  “We  see  a  lot  more  younger 
consumers shopping in our stores now.  They fall in the 20-25 year bracket, and shop a 
lot more even though their budgets are relatively smaller” (cited in Bhushan and Anand   47 
2005, see also Verma 2005). Though this market segment is still relatively small, it has 
nonetheless provided openings to aspiring designers in India from the demand side. 
 
A new trend observed in recent  years is the arrival in India of expatriate and 
western designers (from France, Italy, UK) who are beginning to form joint ventures with 
Indian designers to cater to the domestic and export markets (See Tewari 2004).  For 
example, ‘Lecoanet India’ a France-based apparel design firm headed by an expatriate 
that had design studios in France and a factory in Latvia, on a trip to India in the late 
1990s forged ties with local designers and manufacturers and decided to move the factory 
from Latvia to India.  Then, a few years later, they moved the design center to India “to 
be closer to the producers;”  “Design must cater to the way people work” (Interview, 
Rewal, New Delhi, 2004).  Eventually the company moved its entire staff—one Swiss 
designer, two Latvians, and one Romanian to India.  Currently it is building a “Design 
Loft” with the help of an Italian consultant, in the Information City technology park, in 
the heart of the BPO region of Delhi-Gurgaon. (Interview, Rewal, New Delhi 2004).   
 
The broader point here is that there are larger scale effects of these industrial 
shifts.  For example the rise of the BPO and IT sectors – the fastest growing industries in 
the  past  decade—is  fuelling  demand  via  important  income  effects  for  higher  value 
products  that  is  supporting  the  expansion--indeed  creation—of  new  domestic  market 
segments that are higher value and more skill-intensive.  The BPO and IT sector boom 
has endowed a new, and younger segment of the (urban) workforce with much higher 
purchasing power than it previously had access to.  This segment of the workforce -  with 
particular tastes is fuelling demand for domestic (and overseas) branded apparel at a pace 
not seen in the home market before. This demand is augmented by the arrival on the 
scene  of  retailing  formats  such  as  malls  that  are  providing  ready  outlets  for  goods 
catering to this growing market niche.  Thus, from the demand side, this preference for 
higher  value  apparel,  and  the  growing  availability  of  organized  distribution  channels 
through which these products can be marketed is creating the conditions for the rise or 
development of whole new segments of the apparel industry in India that did not exist 
before, which in turn can fuel new, higher value capabilities on the supply side, across the   48 
value chain.  Investments by the government two decades ago in institutions such as the 
National Institute for Fashion Technology, is reinforcing this “market-creating” cycle by 
generating a supply of skilled local designers who are progressively becoming absorbed 
in the new cycles of demand.   
 
 
7  Conclusions 
 
This paper examined India’s recent integration into the global apparel market to 
understand alternative forms on global insertion that are occurring, especially in light of 
the elimination of quotas.  The paper made three points. First, it showed that India’s 
(evolving) path to integration in the world market in clothing has been quite different 
from the experience of many of its competitors. India’s trajectory does not fit very well 
either with neo-liberal arguments about the deregulation of the Indian economy in the 
early 1990s unleashing the growth potential of Indian apparel (Indian apparel exports 
took off in the mid-1980s), nor with the trajectories of other successful exporters – e.g. 
FDI-led integration into vertical clothing chains controlled by dominant global buyers (as 
in the case of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, China), or by entry into regional trade 
agreements with major importing countries (Mexico, Caribbean basin, Eastern Europe 
and North African countries on the European rim), or by massively scaling up production 
capacities driven by sustained and deep incorporation into the outsourcing networks of 
some of the world’s leading clothing buyers (China, East and South-East Asia).  Though 
the Indian government is now attempting to attract FDI into textiles, apparel and retail, 
and domestic firms are scaling up rapidly as well as exploring global partnerships, these 
features have followed successful integration into export markets, rather than led to it.  
An understanding of the Indian case thus offers insights into alternative trajectories of 
upgrading and global integration that do not depend so centrally on prior participation in 
regional trade agreements, on major FDI, or on deep  integration into the world’s major 
clothing value chains.   
 
Second,  the  paper  argued  that  India’s  rather  quick  emergence  as  a  successful 
textile  and  garment  exporter  after  years  of  inward  orientation  had  more  to  do  with   49 
changes in domestic policy that took place throughout the 1980s and 1990s -- and how 
these changes interacted with global trade regulations on the one hand, and with ongoing 
transformations in the Indian domestic market on the other -- than with purely external 
factors.  The  internal  deregulation  of  the  mid-1980s  encouraged  a  steady  build  up  of 
domestic investment and induced cycles of technological upgrading within the textile and 
apparel sector in ways that targeted both exports and the home market. The external 
sector  reforms  (trade  liberalization)  of  1991  deepened  some  of  the  trends  that 
deregulation had produced. The strong tier of domestic firms that the earlier reforms had 
created,  are  now  at  the  vanguard  of  India’s  growing  global  presence  in  clothing  and 
textiles. These domestic firms, with their backward linkages into an extensive domestic 
textile base, have now increasingly transitioned into full package supply and branded 
manufacturing.    These  domestic  firms  are  thus  playing  a  stronger  role  in  the 
internationalization of Indian textiles and apparel than major external drivers such as the 
role of global buyers, FDI, or preferential trade agreements. 
 
Finally, the paper argued that some of the same factors that account for India’s 
slow integration into global textile and apparel markets have also, indirectly, provided 
subsets a segment of the industry with opportunities to move along a different, more high 
road path to upgrading and export growth. The features associated with this growth path 
are  a  flexible  organization  of  production  that  can  accommodate  small-batches  of 
increasingly  design-intensive  and  higher  value  product  categories.    Rapid  automation 
accompanied by a rising demand for skilled workers has put a premium on training which 
in turn is associated ironically with a tight labor market, better working conditions and 
higher than minimum wages for a subset of the workers in this labor-intensive sector. As 
the Indian textile and apparel industry adjusts to the uncertainties of the post-MFA world, 
an  understanding  of  the  diverse  paths  of  adjustment  at  the  firm  level  is  critical.  The 
presence of a strong set of internationally integrated domestic firms, a growing design 
sensibility, and the emergence of a set of upgrading processes that are not necessarily tied 
to commoditized labor or deep dependence on footloose global textile value chains is a 
hopeful finding.   50 
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